Abstract. Part 1 of this two-part paper presented a spatial economic model of the urban development process which captures developers' profit-seeking behaviour, communities' welfare-seeking behaviour, and the mediating effects of alternative systems of land-use rights. Different systems of rights were shown to result in different land-use and density outcomes. In part 2 we describe the simulation model used to implement the theoretical model. The emphasis is on explaining the cellular automata methodology, but we also go on to illustrate the model output by comparing the structure and economic performance of two simulations. One simulates a free-market city in which developers have full property rights over land use. The other simulates a city in which the community has land-use rights and uses these to regulate development densities at socially optimal levels.
Introduction
The main objective of this paper is to describe the approach taken to simulating our theoretical model within a cellular automaton. In this we try to give sufficient information to convey the mechanics of the method without confusing the reader with excessive detail. To avoid clutter we have left a full discussion of the quality and usefulness of the output of the model to other papers. Here we introduce the performance measures that it generates and illustrate these with reference to two simulations. In section 2 we comment on the general implementation strategy and in section 3 we discuss the local kernel evaluation function used to simulate the effect of same-use clustering on the developer's profit function. Section 4 is a description of the use of a spatial interaction field to simulate the community compensation function. In section 5 we define density, profit, and social cost equilibria in terms of the simulation model. In section 6 we present the Monte Carlo process which governs land conversion under multiuse competition and in section 7 discuss the problem of converting profit to development probability. Section 8 is a general discussion of performance indicators in cellular automata (CA) models. In section 9 we introduce two illustrative simulations-free market and planned-and in section 10 discuss their performance. We conclude with comments about the simulations, about the overall methodology, and about future work.
General simulation strategy
The cellular automaton is coded in the AML macrolanguage and uses Arclnfo GRID routines except for the function which evaluates the height of the community externality function. This is written in C and called from within Arclnfo. In figure 1 (see over) we chart the simulation algorithm. There are two initial states in the simulation: (1) An initial land-use grid which consists of a small number of 'preexisting' developed cells distributed randomly. In our current experiments there are only two land-use categories-housing and industrial-but this can readily be expanded.
(2) A community boundary grid which we have currently set to define approximately thirty static jurisdictions in the city.
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Let §U k , the marginal profit function for land use k on any cell be defined as
and let the coefficients take the values a = 1000 and /? = 0.1. Similarly, let the community marginal externality function be defined as
with an arbitrary value for 9 of 0.05 and S defined as yoc, that is, the intercept of the profit function multiplied by a constant y. This is a way of defining the height of 5E c (g) as a function of the height of 511^(0. The theoretical basis for doing this is the assumption that a community's valuation of an externality when it comes to negotiating compensation is as reasonably defined as a function of the profits of the polluting use as it is by an absolute value. In subsequent work we experiment with absolute compensation functions. We assume here, however, that the community's valuation of the externalities produced by the first unit of output is limited at the maximum to a fixed proportion of the marginal profit made from the first unit of output. These functions form the basis of the transition rules that simulate various equilibria consistent with various regulative regimes introduced in the first paper (Webster and Wu, 1999) and discussed below in section 5.
For iterations 1 to m, all cells in the land-use grid are evaluated for conversion by using two types of evaluation function (see figure 1 for the procedure). First, a conventional 3x3 local kernel operator is applied to measure the number of contiguous land uses around a cell (figure 2). The kernel returns a variable that is used to raise the height of the profit function in proportion to the agglomeration of same uses in the local neighbourhood. Agglomeration effects are assumed to enhance the profitability of residential and industrial uses. Second, a spatial interaction routine measures the height of the community compensation curve for residential cells in the same jurisdiction as the cell being evaluated. This returns a variable which can be used either to depress the height of the profit function for the evaluated cell (for regulated or negotiated market regimes) or to measure the social costs within the jurisdiction without influencing the profitability of the cell (free-market regimes). A similar function measures social costs of industrial cells within an interaction field defined irrespective of jurisdictional boundaries. This is used to capture social costs that spill over into neighbouring jurisdictions which allow city-wide valuation of externalities. It is not used to modify the profit functions of polluting land uses because we assume that it is only residents within the same jurisdiction as an industrial site that can influence its land use.
These evaluations yield two profit maps that record the height of the intercept on the profit function (and by deduction a total maximum profitability) for each cell for both land uses. The profit maps for housing and industry are then subjected to independent Monte Carlo processes. For each land use the probability of the development of each cell is computed by comparing its profitability with some comparator (such as the maximum profitability in the city), yielding a probability map for each land use. These are then compared with a random value map to give a bid map for each land use. If only one land use bids for the cell it is converted. If both land uses bid for a cell, the bids are compared and it is converted to the use that bids the highest. With the land-use map thus updated, performance measures are recorded from the maps used in the update process and stored in an indicator matrix used for analysing changes in system performance indicators over time. Iterations continue until land-use change stabilises or, if it is oscillating, until some maximum number of iterations is reached.
Local kernel evaluation function
The local transition rule kernels for industrial and housing development yield a variable which reflects the extent to which profit from industrial or housing development is augmented by the local land-use context. An agglomeration-sensitive profit function is defined as 5IT*(2) = A*a-pQ,
where A^ is the agglomeration coefficient for cell ij and land use k, returned from the neighbourhood kernel. A^ is defined as where n k is the number of adjacent cells classified as land use k. This assumes that an empty cell being evaluated for industry and fully surrounded by industry cells has twice the profitability of an empty cell completely surrounded by any other use. Neighbouring industrial cells augment the profitability of an empty cell for industry at a pro rata rate of+0.125% per cell.
Community marginal externality function
Let W^j be a second type of coefficient that reduces the profitability of a polluting cell for use A: as a function of community regulative behaviour and of the community's externality valuation function. Following the theory developed in paper 1 (Webster and Wu, 1999) , assume that the value that a community (defined for now as the residents of a jurisdiction) places on the externalities generated by use k in cell ij is a function of two variables: the size of the community (indicated by the number of housing cells in a jurisdiction) and the distance that a polluting cell lies from the community (measured by some aggregate distance function). This expresses the theoretical notions that the total social costs of the spillover effect from a land use is a positive function of the number of households consuming the spillover and a negative function of the distance to each. To define the spatial decay effect let V^ be the maximum intensity of demand in jurisdiction / for compensation from a polluting use locating in cell ij: (a) (b) Figure 3 . The measurement of aggregate community demand for compensation through spatial interaction formula: (a) the maximum aggregate demand for compensation at a site ij; (b) the actual dynamic demand for compensation at a site ij.
where d cij is the distance between cell c and cell ij, B" = 1 for all cells in jurisdiction / apart from cell ij for which B" = 0, and m is the total number of cells in jurisdiction /. This value represents the extreme situation, depicted in figure 3 (a), in which only one cell, cell ij, is a polluting cell and all other cells in the jurisdiction are housing cells placing a certain value on the pollution. The V/j is not itself that valuation but is used to compute it in a way that takes into account both the number of residents (housing cells) and their distance from the polluting cell. Let /^ be the actual intensity of demand in jurisdiction J for compensation from a polluting use locating in cell ij: Ifj = X>'exp(/W c> ,.,.), (6) where B' -1 for all those cells in J classified as housing and 0 otherwise. This is depicted in figure 3(b). Then define a ratio that gives the degree of intensity of demand for compensation compared with the maximum intensity scenario:
The advantage of this coefficient is that it captures the spatial decay of externality effects in an equilibrium analysis of profit and externality functions.
We have already given the profit and externality functions 811 k (Q) and 5E C (0 arbitrary but plausible definitions: 5n*(2) = oi-pQ,
with a = 1000, /? = 0.1, 9 = 0.05, and 3 = ya. Assume that the maximum proportion of profit demanded by the community at the first unit increase in output equals 70% so that y = 0.7. Then assume this to be the maximum valuation associated with the extreme situation in which there is a maximum possible intensity of demand for compensation within a jurisdiction, defined as Vfj above. For any intensity of demand less than V^, the height of the 5E C (0 curve will fall proportionally by the factor:
This is fully consistent with the theory developed in paper 1 in which the communities' aggregate externality curve, or the aggregate marginal willingness to pay for the avoidance of the externality, is a positive function of the number of individuals in the community (number of housing cells in the jurisdiction), adjusted by the aggregate distance of each housing cell from the cell being evaluated for industry. The limit to the aggregation is defined relative to the maximum profit expected from developing the cell in an industrial use.
Equilibrium development density and profits
Armed with these two simulated functions, we can define a number of quantities that relate to the development control behaviour introduced in paper 1. These include the following.
(1) The maximum profit from use k at cell ij is given by the area under the profit function between 0 and Q' (the intercept of the profit function on the Q-axis):
o which equals
When the kernel has no augmenting or diminishing effect, this equals, for example, 5000000 (a =1000, p = 0.1, and A = 1).
(2) The equilibrium intensity of land use k in cell ij is given by the intersection of 5n*(fi) and 5E C (Q):
This allows various equilibrium compensation and betterment quantities to be defined. Two are given as examples below but any quantity can be computed to correspond to the alternative property rights discussed and drawn in paper 1.
The community regulates land-use intensity to the socially optimal level Q k * but does not seek compensation. The profit from (and therefore attraction of) cell ij is given by the area under hU k {Q) to the left of £>*:
JO which equals
(4) The community awards itself artificially low land-use regulations in order to maximise compensation revenue. It negotiates compensation up to Q* after which the developer can no longer afford the marginal compensation payments demanded by the community. Also assume that the community only exacts compensation, not betterment. This is equal to the area C in the diagrams in paper 1. If we assume an intensity regulation of g p , then the profit from developing cell ij is given by the area under 8II*(0 to the left of Q* less the area under 5E C (0 between g p and Q*: ]^ 6 Probability of bidding Profits of development are calculated at appropriate equilibria relating to the particular regulative regime being simulated. Strictly speaking, the equilibrium state is a point on a constantly changing marginaLprofit surface. Whereas the systematic parameters are set_ constant for the simulation, the development parameters-the value returned from a local kernel evaluation of neighbouring development (Ay) and the ratio of compensation (W tj )-change over each iteration. Thus, the marginal profitability and externality vary from cell to cell and from time to time, redefining the equilibrium state of land development and thus the expected profitability of a particular cell development. Developers act according to the development opportunity assessment which we model as a comparison of the profit level of a particular site with the maximum (possible) profitability of a similar development. The maximum industrial development profit is assumed to be made in a situation where the local land-use kernel returns the highest value of agglomeration and where the development need not compensate the community for externalities created. The profitability evaluated for a cell divided by this maximum profitability gives the ratio of profitability which is used to assess the attractiveness of the cell. The probability of bidding, however, depends upon more than the profit ratio alone. As ours is a two-sector land-use model, a possible equilibrium may exist between different sectors of land developments. In other words, if the overall profitability of a sector is high enough to induce resource reallocation, capital would be withdrawn from the less profitable sector to the more profitable sector, thus creating a tendency to balance the overall profitability between different development sectors. This is captured in the simulation by a process through which the increase of land conversion in a sector (housing or industry) would reduce the overall profitability of that sector. This is achieved through 'anchoring' the probability of raising a bid for a particular cell at a level equal to the mean profit ratio to 0.5. This is done both for industrial and for residential developments and is a plausible simulation of land conversion because it mimics the resource-allocation readjustment as well as the development opportunity assessment of available sites.
The transformation from the profit map to a map giving the probability of raising a bid for a particular land-use development (probability map) should intuitively be nonlinear. This is because most sites will range around an average level of profitability with fewer sites being very attractive or very unattractive in terms of profit making. This is the nature of the land market for a variety of reasons. Bidders for a very profitable site which stands out from other available sites are likely to bid significant premiums. There is a connection here with random utility theory. If the available sites are viewed as choices, the probability of choosing a site could be approximated by a multinomial logit form, assuming that the random disturbance follows an extreme value distribution. Alternatively, we can view the issue of choice from the reverse perspective. If a site is given a binary state-receiving a bid or not-then the probability of such a state can be modelled as a multinomial logit distribution of joint variables representing the site and the bidder. In our model, bidders are considered homogenous, that is, developers have identical characteristics. As the state is a binary case, it can be simplified as a logistic form, given by
where, Py is the probability of raising a bid at the site if at the time t; K is a dispersion parameter; T and T are the ratio and mean ratio of the profitability of a location given by Profit ratio Figure 4 . The development opportunity assessment according to the ratio of after-compensation profit to the maximum growth.
The dispersion parameter reflects the extent to which the 'noise' (unknown variation due, for example, to developers' bounded information) disturbs the bidding process. Figure 4 gives three commonly used parameter levels and their respective effects on the probability of transformation. It can be seen that the higher the value of K, the more sensitive the differentiation of the profit around the mean level. Although not reported here because of limited space, we have experimented with these three dispersion parameter values and produced bidding maps with different level of randomness.
Monte Carlo process
A Monte Carlo device is used to simulate the nondeterministic operations of the land market. Intuitively, land-use changes are quite 'noisy', subject to a probabilistic game of bidding. Land is a quasi-unique commodity, each parcel possessing site and situation features geographically fixed at its location and each developer's information about these features is incomplete. Uncertainty within one development sector is compounded by the introduction of additional sectors. Each housing developer, for example, will bid according to his or her own bounded information and according to his or her anticipated profit levels (bid rent). In a two-or-more-sector model, the result of a bid will depend on the information and anticipated profit of other bidders. These contingencies are handled by two independent Monte Carlo processes for industrial and residential developments. The Monte Carlo processes model the uncertainty relating to incomplete knowledge and other random features of the decisionmaking process within each sector. They yield either a single bid from one of the two sectors or two bids, one from each. If the latter happens, then the bids are compared and the highest wins the cell. The Monte Carlo algorithm compares the probability of raising a bid (the probability map) with a random grid generated to determine whether the developer has actually proposed a bid or not. For the sites that only receive a bid from one type of development as a result of this comparison, the conversion to that type of use is recorded in the evolving land-use map. This allows for potentially winning bids not to come forward (modelling bounded information and other random factors). Only when two bids are proposed at the same site are they compared to give the market land use which is then recorded on the emerging land-use grid.
Performance indicators
Cellular automata are powerful tools for simulating complex nonlinear systems. As a result of complexity, the temporal evolution of a model might show nonequilibrium features, for example, the self-organising processes that follow strange attractors. Simulation results are frequently analysed via reductionist indicators/These might be divided into generic and performance indicators. Generic indicators in urban and regional studies include a wide variety of measurements of spatial organisation, pattern, and form. For example, Batty and Longley (1994) discuss the fractal measurement and White and Engelen (1993) compare the fractals of simulated land use with those of real-world cities. Webster (1996) measures the frequency of a Fourier series within a mosaic of land uses, which, similar to the fractal, is a generic indicator of urbanregularity regardless of scale. Entropy of land-use patterns and conversion matrices have been used to calculate a spatial redundancy indicator, reflecting the development of pattern organisation (Phipps, 1989) . Similarly, Portugali et al (1994) define instability-segregation indices to study changes in residential structures. Whereas generic indicators might reflect various facets of self-organisation processes (perhaps more obviously with phase transition and bifurcation graphs), performance indicators serve as meaningful descriptions of socioeconomic systems. Although not generically different, systems may still be different from each other in terms of various performance measurements. Generic indicators are precise mathematical descriptions of the shape and dimensions of physical forms, surfaces, series, or models. Performance indicators, on the other hand, capture more of the model than its physical characteristics and are important for the application of CA in urban studies. With less emphasis on the purity of local transition rules and with the introduction of sophisticated rules of the game, CA can serve as a general methodology for observing complex, collective, and interactive behaviour. With a CA model constructed, subsequent simulations produce a series of spatial forms (both discrete and continuous) to be observed. Performance indicators interpret those forms in relation to the theory and the purpose of the model. Purpose-related measurements have been used in CA simulation applications as well as generic indicators (for example, Semboloni, 1997; Wu and Webster, 1998) .
Comparing cities with and without community property rights over land use
We shall explore the features of alternative regimes in a more systematic way in subsequent papers. In this section, we illustrate some preliminary findings from two simulated regimes. First, a free-market regime is simulated in which industrial land developers are free to develop at the maximum profitable density. This is assumed to be a socially inefficient city because development intensity is at a level at which marginal social costs exceed marginal social benefits. In terms of figure 3 in paper 1, industrial developers produce at Q' yielding themselves profit equal to A -f B + D and generating social costs equal to A + B + C. The degree of social inefficiency is given by the area C which is the social costs net of social benefits above the social optimum density Q *. Residents of the city are assumed to have no property rights over land use which might restrict development intensities to some more socially acceptable level. It is furthermore assumed that the community is unable to induce developers to develop less by bribe or compensation, even though it has the incentive to do so (its marginal valuation of the social cost is greater than the developer's marginal net revenue beyond Q *). This inability to act collectively may be assumed to result either from the free-riding problems associated with large numbers or from laws prohibiting municipal governments from using revenue in this way. Either way, the community has an incentive to negotiate with developers to build more reasonably but has no power to do so.
Second, a regime is simulated in which the community holds land-use rights and uses them to ensure socially optimal levels of industrial development as defined in paper 1, figure 3 and paper 2, equation (13). Industrial developers are assumed to be compelled by regulation to develop at intensity Q*, the point at which marginal social costs equal marginal benefits. No compensation or betterment is exacted by the community and the developer faces net revenue equal to area A'+ D in figure 3 in paper 1. The significant feature of this simulation is that, as the city grows, this equilibrium development intensity and profit level for any particular cell being evaluated for industry changes. It changes because the height of the externality curve §E kc (Q) is a function of the number of and distance from housing cells in the same jurisdiction.
The simulations start with randomly seeded industrial and residential cells and an exogenously defined set of thirty local jurisdictions. It is only the housing cells within the same jurisdiction as an industrial cell that can add to the demand for a reduction in its development density. Interjurisdictional spillover costs are ignored. The following performance indicators are used in section 10 to discuss the differences between the two simulations. (a) Total profitability of a cell for residential and for industrial development: for each cell, the profit is the area under the marginal profit curve, to the point where the marginal profit falls to zero (the free-market regime), or to the left of intersection with the marginal externality curve (the regulated regime). The total profit in the urban system is the sum of profits for all cells. For either land use, average profit equals total profit for that use divided by the number of cells in that use. (b) Total social cost of industrial development: for each cell, the social cost is the area under the marginal externality curve to the left of the development intensity level, that is, the maximum intensity in a free-market regime and optimal intensity in the regulated regime. The total social cost in the city is the sum of the total costs for each industrial cell developed and the average social cost is that sum divided by the number of industrial cells. In the next section we illustrate the use of these generic and performance indicators to compare the cities developed under the two regulative regimes. Figure 5 (a) and 6(a) show the evolution of the two cities over 50 iterations and figures 5(b) and 6(b) reproduce the 50th iterations showing jurisdictional boundaries. The evolving shape of the simulations should be read in conjunction with the performance indicator graphs which show what is happening to the economic system as the morphology evolves. Figures 7 and 8 , for example, show a selection of the indicators captured at each iteration. To illustrate the rich information generated by our CA simulations we consider briefly four patterns from the images and indicator profiles.
Discussion

Natural zoning
Starting from the randomly distributed land-use seeds, both regimes display clear differentiation between the two land uses under the influence of agglomeration economies modelled by the profit-modifying kernel function (3). The large natural zones (same-use clusters) are a stable feature of both simulations as shown by the performance indicators plotted in'figures'7 and 8. There are, however, morphological distinctions between the two regimes. The industrial areas in the regulated regime form more compact clusters compared with the continuous belts of the free-market regime. Residential communities' demand for regulation has the effect of progressively lowering the profitability at the thinner points of the market regime's linear clusters until they are broken up into smaller clusters. In ecological terms, the residential uses invade the natural linear clusters of a free-market city until the more compact industrial clusters have a strong enough form to resist further invasion. This resistance comes from the strength of the industrial agglomeration effect and the pattern stabilises when the profit-enhancing agglomeration effect balances the profit-diminishing effect of conservative residential communities. They do, however, constantly move as iterations proceed but do so in a way that maintains the stability of performance indicators.
10.2 Stable profits and generic morphology with constantly shifting clusters In both regimes average developer profit per cell is increasing both for housing and industrial land during the first 10 iterations because the clustering of land uses rapidly yields agglomeration benefits. When most cells are surrounded by the same use, however, the growth in profit is diminished. Some cells eventually form the interface with a different land use in an increasingly stable generic spatial configuration and thus, after a certain level, the overall profit can no longer be raised. The exact location of interuse boundaries changes as we have said, but the profit performance is in the stable state shown in figure 7(b) . When the iterations are animated on screen the shifting land-use pattern appears as two types of liquid (water and oil) that cannot^ be mixed. The reason why the shape is constantly changing is the random noise arising from the probabilistic nature of the simulation. A cell might change from a more profitable to a less profitable use because of factors not modelled explicitly but captured in the random effect of the Monte Carlo process. The city adjusts in the next iteration to maintain (or regain) the upward but shallowing trajectory of profitefficiency increases.
10.3 Rising social efficiency over time in the free-market city The difference between the average social cost and industrial profit curves of a simulation [figures 7(a) and 7(b)] is a measure of the efficiency of the simulated city. It is interesting to note that the gap between the curves is rising throughout the 50 iterations for the free-market city [figure 7(d)] and we can conclude that the city is organising itself into a progressively socially efficient form. This means that, as a city of two incompatible land uses organises itself spatially over time, the profit-driven process of natural zoning leads to both higher average profits and increasing average net benefits (average private profits less average social costs). The self-organising free-market city thus becomes increasingly efficient in both a private and a public sense.
Falling social costs in the regulated city
The consequence of community land use rights for social efficiency can be seen in figure 8(a) . Average social costs are constantly decreasing over the 50 iterations in the regulated simulation. This reflects the ability of the regulated city to optimise the spatial organisation of polluting uses. The community's ability to force profit margins down on cells near to residential clusters results in a progressively efficient spatial pattern of activities. It should be noted that average social costs fall at the same time as average industrial profit rises. Thus, when compared with the free-market city, we may conclude that both display an ability to self-organise towards greater private and social efficiency, but the planned city is able to achieve reductions in average social costs as it evolves while still maintaining growth in industrial profit levels. The free-market process of natural zoning cannot reduce social costs; it can only limit them to some constant level that is maintained while average industrial development profitability continues to grow. The regulated city is therefore a cleaner city with higher residential utility but lower average industrial land profitability.
Conclusion
The methodology presented in these two papers demonstrates an approach to urban simulation that draws together cellular GIS modelling and the formal economic theory of cities. We have illustrated the approach by creating explicit partial equilibrium models of (a) the market demand for regulation, (b) the market demand for land under specific uses, and (c) the market demand for varying densities of development. The spatial distribution of land uses, the density of development at any particular location, and the private development profit and social cost of developing each cell are all determined endogenously. The slope of private profit and social cost curves and the heuristic agglomeration functions are determined exogenously at arbitrary but plausible levels. The hybrid model that results is one in which the city organises itself on the basis of transition rules which have fields at three different spatial scales: immediate neighbour fields that define agglomeration functions, jurisdictional fields that define community behaviour functions and city-wide fields that define urban performance functions. The city evolves under local equilibria following the normal CA paradigm but may also be interpreted as being in partial economic equilibrium in respect of the balancing of private profit and social costs. In principle, it should be possible to build far more complex economic models into a CA by using a similar approach. The binding constraints are computational. A strength of our methodology is the additional dimensions of analysis that it permits of the simulations. The underlying economic models yield performance indicators as well as the more common generic morphological measures. Simulated cities can be compared on the basis of total, average, and marginal costs and benefits at a point in time or over time as the simulations proceed. The CA component adds a spatial dimension to the behavioural models that goes beyond the normal treatment of space in neoclassical urban economic models. Because CA models are trend dependent, we do not know (although we may guess) what the manifestation of particular economic equilibria will be in cellular space. Neither do we know what the associated system performance outcomes will be. The nondeterministic nature of the CA algorithm introduces additional unknowns: what will be the spatial manifestation of unpredictable events such as lower bidders winning a location? As well as offering answers to such questions, our simulations generate further hypotheses and thus contribute to theory development in the fullest sense. In future papers we intend to report the results of experiments conducted with this methodology. In one such experiment we are currently working on we test, for the first time as far as we are aware, a spatial version of the Coasian-invariance theorem applied to land-use regulation (Lai, 1994; Pogodzinski and Sass, 1990; Webster, 1998) .
